The Egg and The Sperm Or/And Feminism and Science.
In this story, we are going to discuss some major ideas expressed by female scientists regarding the role of gender in science and how gender roles are embedded and define biological discourses of human reproduction.
In order to be introduced to concepts related to elements of constructing gender and social norms through science, we are examining two classical papers of Keller and Martin. We are addressing them separately, so that we can later find their common central ideas.
You can find the article of E. Martin here: https://web.stanford.edu/~eckert/PDF/Martin1991.pdf
And the article of E.Keller here:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3173856
I. Reflection on E.Martin “The Egg & The Sperm”
The author aims at demystifying how the social and cultural stereotypes influence reproductive biology and additionally questions if the educational process is “black-boxing” cultural beliefs and practices as parts of nature. She focuses on the classical depiction of female biological processes (the egg) as less important than their male counterparts (the sperm), which also leads to the harmful idea that women are less worthy than men.
Female biological processes are presented as productive enterprise — a ‘baby-making system- where natural biological processes such as menstruation are considered as system failures, loss, and inefficient. On the contrary, spermatogenesis is met with extreme enthusiasm and the male reproductive process is dealt with as a sort of “perpetual motion machine” — always producing enough, but constrained due to the aforementioned “female system failures”.
This classical analogy of spermatogenesis to menstruation is not accurate not only in its implications but also in biological terms. Ovulation is the “corresponding” female process, which is presented in the textbook materials as a passive procedure that leads to degeneration, with female organs presented as “old and worn out” — in contrast to spermatogenesis, who continuously produces fresh germ cells and described as dominant, dynamic and long-lived.
With these analogies, we can see the rise of a “burden of time” for women to reproduce — a feeling that time is running out for them. In doing so, we can see a pointless value asymmetry appearing, in a process that by definition “takes two to tango”:
egg production is presented as inferior because it is finished at birth,
sperm production is presented as superior because it is continuous from puberty to senescence
Continuing with examples and instances, we see that while oogenesis is considered “wasteful”, the same claim could be made for the male’s vast production of sperm could also be considered as such but never addressed in such a way. Martin shows us how scientific language and explanatory terms is reproducing social norms regarding male and female behavior:
It is remarkable how “femininely” the egg behaves and how “masculinely” the sperm.
The egg is something large and static, fragile, waiting to be “filled” by the sperm, it has a protective cell with “vestments,” a term usually reserved for sacred, religious dress. The sperm is active, driven by its mission, young and on the mission; a comme il faut “rebel with a cause”. Female organs are viewed as interdependent while male organs as autonomous.
The author also shows depictions of these literary technologies on sperm depiction, by mentioning the use of scientific language similar to a corporate manager’s version of the sperm’s activities. We almost never see depictions of sperm and male organs as timid and weak and additionally, we aren’t taught the mechanics of spermatogenesis, the various stages and organs involved.
Martin argues that while the “facts” of biology may not always be constructed in cultural terms, in this case, they are. In present terms applications she notices that while textbooks are being revised and new research initiated, the social gender imaginary persists and adapts. New research contradicted the idea of sperm as forceful penetrators, showing the active participation of the “egg” in the reproductive process and breaking cultural expectations.
But the imaginary persists and it is evident of the scientific language used to describe the new findings, as Martin shows. The view that sperm and egg are mutually active partners can be considered as almost heretical. Even when an interactive relation of male and female productive organs is monitored, the activeness of the sperm is not challenged: female organs even can be regarded as “sperm receptors” — the locks that need the key. This concept can also oppose terms of scientific regulation as did happen in the Wassarman case that the author examines.
In order to think beyond these socially constructed ideas that “scientifically” dress themselves, we have to challenge the hierarchical imagery and avoid a new one that could play another cultural stereotype: woman as a dangerous and aggressive threat (the spider imaginary).
We need to envision a less stereotypical view from a feminist perspective and to fight the power hidden within the scientific content of texts. We need to understand that biological models, descriptions, and their data can have important social effects, study them and attempt to deconstruct them (both the models and the effects).
The author concludes with the affirmation that if we stop:
projecting cultural imagery onto what we study, (we) will improve our ability to investigate and understand nature.
II. Reflection on E.Keller “Feminism and Science” p. 589–595
Keller focuses on the criticism of science from a feminist perspective, while also positioning herself as a feminist and scientist. The author is wondering if her scientific “addiction” in specific terms, norms, and practices are not allowing her to question science in feminist terms or if her feminist ideas would make her seen as challenges the idea of science neutrality,
In this dilemma and the element of feminist criticism, where some could see a conflict, Keller tries to see a liberating potential for science — a close attendance on feminist criticism would allow science to advance.
She shows us that feminist criticism of science is not a unified body, unrelated to political views — while most proponents agree that science embodies strong androcentric bias, they offer different reasons and meanings to why this is happening. Meanings that pose different levels of challenge and thus we should examine them separately and not dismiss them entirely as units.
The liberal critique focuses on workplace inequalities, demanding equal employment opportunity, and it is not conflicted with traditional conceptions of science. We could argue that it could be accepted even by conservative scientists.
A more radical approach sees the patriarchical bias expressed in the choice and definition of problems with which scientists have concerned themselves. Usually, these claim is related to health science, where we can see feminists arguing for example that:
menstrual cramps, a serious problem for many women, have never been taken seriously by the medical profession.
Or bias expressed in the level of experimental design and interpretation, where for certain domains they have not been confirmed and the standards of objectivity operating seems to apply, while for others (more socially oriented sciences) we can find the truth to such claims.
For these sciences, we could say that the dominance of men scientists and their social status allows them to attribute gender roles to their studies, which results to a “softer” scientific process, in which fair-minded (or scientifically minded) scientists can and should join forces with the feminists in attempting to identify the presence of bias -equally offensive, for different reasons, to both scientists and feminists.
But the author argues that it is impossible to deal with the truly radical critique if we do not critique the very assumptions of objectivity and rationality that underlie the scientific enterprise. She makes an extremely eye-opening remark:
It is not true that “the conclusions of natural science are true and necessary, and the judgment of man has nothing to do with them”; it is the judgment of women that they have nothing to do with.
Patriarchal bias can be found in the social structure of science, on the scientific language, in the gender roles, etc. What feminist thought tells us is that we cannot allow scientific thought to be determined only by its own logical and empirical necessities — but also understand it as a social process.
If we cannot trust the scientific process as objective, then is there any value to arguing — why don’t we simply turn to the political domain for answers? This question is hard to answer and has led to feminism relativism and the abandoning of the claim for representation in the scientific culture by feminists. Feminism relativism turns the political spectrum into a political circle and a self-fulfilling prophecy: it exacerbates the very problem it wishes to solve.
Instead, Keller proposes a twofold feminist theoretic in science:
- reclaiming for women what has historically been denied to them;
- and to legitimate those elements of scientific culture that have been denied precisely because they are defined as female.
We do not need to cancel the possibility of mediation between the male and female or to attribute objectivity based on gender. What we need to do is, distinguishing objective effort from the objectivist illusion. As the author puts it:
We must not abandon the quintessential human effort to understand the world in rational terms, we need to refine that effort.
III. Comments
We see on these two papers common points such as:
- the social process for the classification of knowledge,
- the influence of gender roles on the process,
- the need for a feminist perspective in order to correct the mistakes of androcentric approaches.
Keller argues that this perspective would also improve the scientific method and Martin shows that this can happen by revising the literary technologies apparent in different domains.
Their combination leaves us with a question: What does it mean to do science as a feminist?
I think that we can answer in the shape way as Keller did- not to see the identities of feminists and scientists as conflinging but as commonly-evolving. In this way, a claim to do science in a feminist way is a claim to revolutionize science: to make the social process evident, the patriarchy apparent and to find how its new knowledge would help advance our efforts for objective science.
Additionally, it would be interesting to imagine or discuss science as gender fluid and the implication this would have — wouldn’t a “queer” science be more conscious on the social process, the social construction of gender, and even science?
Drop a line, a comment or a clap if you find anything interesting here!
Antonis.
